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We propose a ”social physics” model for two-group conflict. We consider two disputing groups.
Each individual i in each of the two groups has a preference si regarding the way in which the conflict
should be resolved. The individual preferences span a range between +M (prone to protracted
conflict) and −M (prone to settle the conflict). The noise in this system is quantified by a ”social
temperature.” Individuals interact within their group and with individuals of the other group. A
pair of individuals (i, j) within a group contributes -si ∗ sj to the energy. The inter-group energy
of individual i is taken to be proportional to the product between si and the mean value of the
preferences from the other group’s members. We consider an equivalent-neighbor Renyi - Erdos
network where everyone interacts with everyone. We present some examples of conflicts that may
be described with this model.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s Social and economic system, 89.75.-k Complex systems,
05.90.+m Other topics in statistical physics, thermodynamics, and nonlinear dynamical systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Social conflicts emerge among groups of individuals. For example, in 2016, the elections in the United States and
the Brexit referendum illustrate such conflicts. So do debates around whether a country should sign climate change
accords, whether the pipeline from Canada to Texas should be built, or whether various pieces of land should be
developed or conserved. Social conflicts have been extensively studied theoretically and practically by scholars in
sociology [1], social psychology [2] [3] as well as negotiation and decision making [4] [5]. There is broad consensus
in the literature that social conflicts are complex, and therefore their outcomes are difficult to predict. For example,
the outcome of the Brexit referendum surprised many of those who had ventured to predict it; 50 days before the US
elections, opinion polls fluctuate significantly from one day to the next. Results of the Paris climate change accord
will not be known for decades. Nevertheless, conflicting parties need the ability to prepare and strategize in order
to navigate through uncertainty and be effective in attaining their objectives. Climate change is a rather polarizing
social conflict in the US. Nevertheless, decision makers at the local and state levels have to make ongoing decisions
and engage in adaptive management while uncertain about how the conflict will be resolved and how it will affect
their regions. To manage social conflicts, we can borrow tools from other settings such as planning and policy making
which also require decisions and strategizing about complex, interrelated and unpredictable systems in the absence
of sufficient information. In such settings, prediction can be replaced by anticipation. That is, instead of basing
decisions on a predicted future, anticipation entails generating and exploring possible scenarios. Decision makers can
then devise strategies likely to yield desired results across a range of scenarios [6], [7]. Such strategies are considered
robust in the sense that they do not depend on the advent of a specific future. Anticipative scenarios are helpful,
and even critical in informing parties to complex social conflicts. In the Brexit example, each of the sides could have
improved their respective strategies by considering a range of scenarios; similarly, in the 2016 elections, each of the
two major parties can devise response strategies based on anticipated moves of the opponent. In conflicts surrounding
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2climate change, parties can develop strategies for the possibility that all countries abide by their commitments, as
well as responses to the cases where key actors default or fulfill commitments only partially and even contemplate the
situations where nature responds differently than expected to climate actions or lack thereof. Note that such uses of
anticipative scenarios can be one-sided, when one or more disputants use them to construct their strategies; or they
can even be used by interveners as persuasion tools to manage the conflict, by getting parties to make decisions that
use the same information base (such an approach is called data mediation). Such an approach is more appropriate
to conflicts around climate change, for example, where consensus agreements can emerge, rather than in the elections
example. The Brexit case is interesting in that it was handled by a referendum as a binary choice (as in elections)
but it could also have been resolved by addressing the disputants concerns with various anticipated scenarios of
consequences of staying, or of leaving the EU. In these and other examples
Physics can contribute conceptually and through modeling [8], [9] to the task of analyzing, modeling and generating
possible future states of complex systems such as those involved in social conflicts. For example, the author of Ref.10
has explored the effects of various voting rules on the 2016 US election outcomes. At the conceptual level, the
notion of using toy models to explore states of systems closely parallels the scenario-generating activities involved
in anticipating social futures. At the modeling level, the family of multiplex networks can be used to represent
parsimoniously various patterns of interconnections between individuals within and between groups. In what follows,
we consider the interactions of two groups experiencing conflict around decisions with respect to some specific set
of issues. We use the 2016 elections in the United States to illustrate how anticipatory scenarios can be used to
understand a social conflict and devise resolution strategies.
We consider two groups in conflict. In each group, each individual has a preference or attitude regarding whether or
not to engage in negotiations to resolve their conflict. Preferences in Group A range from −MA to MA. The number
of preferences, or the number of ”states”, is qA. MA reflects a preference for protracted conflict, stemming from
extreme adherence to the group’s ideology, and desire to defend it by any means. This type of attitude leads to being
against any concessions. Its polar opposite, -MA, is equivalent to being prone to any compromise in negotiations.
The midpoint of this range is 0 and represents adherence to the values of one’s group combined with willingness to
find a way out of the conflict with the opposing group. Individual preferences in Group B range similarly from -MB
to MB. For example in the conflict between the Democratic and Republican parties, members’ views range from very
strong adherence to progressivism or conservatism and brooking no compromise (M), to centrist ones (0) adhering
to party values but open to negotiations with members of the opposing party, to quasi-independence and even ability
to switch allegiance (-M). Think of ”Reagan democrats” and ”RINOs” as holding the -M values. In gun control
debates for instance, some Republican politicians (at or close to M) claim any control measure contravenes to the
Second Amendment and is therefore nonnegotiable; some (in the vicinity of 0) would negotiate with their Democrat
counterparts for limited measures they consider consistent with the Second Amendment; and some (at the -M end)
would be willing to accept any measure that might reduce gun violence. Some Democrat politicians (M) do not
countenance any military intervention in Syria, based on lessons learned in the Iraq war; others (0) would negotiate
for very limited intervention as in Libya, and some (-M) are willing to side with their Republican counterparts in a
vigorous intervention plan. The variability or noise in individual preferences is quantified by a social temperature.
Low temperature situations are more settled, while high temperature situations are in flux. Gun control is an example
of a low social temperature conflict as the competing camps are unlikely to be changed by external events. The current
US elections, where things are in flux and the camps are shifting is an example of a high social temperature conflict.
Members within each group interact with each other as well as with members of the opponent group. We can
conceive of each group as a network of members; the networks can interact with each other forming a multiplex [11].
A multiplex model of the translational and rotational degrees of freedom was used [12]to describe plastic crystals.
Recently a similar model [13] was used to describe social processes. Each individual acts with a certain intensity to
persuade others in the group to his/her point of view, and is in turn subject to others’ persuasion efforts. To begin,
we assume that each individual interacts with every other individual inside and between the groups. This corresponds
to the Renyi-Erds equivalent neighbor network, a network with links of equal strength between all nodes [14],[15],[16].
We will also analyse the same model using Monte Carlo simulations [17].
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we describe our model using the mean-field method borrowed from
statistical physics. Dynamical equations are established and the behavior of the groups in interaction is shown in
section III. Discussion on the meaning of the results in real conflicts is given in section IV. Monte Carlo simulations
are shown in section V in various situations. Section VI is devoted to a comparison between mean-field and MC
results with various parameter assumptions. Our concluding remarks are presented in section VII.
3II. MEAN-FIELD MODEL
Our model of individual interactions within each group and between the groups yields group preference averages
s at any time t. For each of two networks (groups) their average values are SA and SB respectively. The in-group
intensity of advocacy (negative energy) of an individual from Group A is J1 ∗s∗SA, while the corresponding intensity
of advocacy of a Group B individual is: J2 ∗ s ∗ SB, where SA is the average of all individual preferences in Group
A and SB is the average of all individual preferences in Group B. When an individual interacts with members of
the opposing group, his/her inter-group intensity of interaction (negative energy) is taken to be proportional to the
product between that individual’s preference s and the mean value of the preferences of the other group’s members:
K12s ∗ SB for an individual in Group A, and K21s ∗ SA for an individual in Group B. In this system, the variability
(noise) in individual preferences s in a group is quantified by a ”social temperature.” We capture this noise using the
Boltzmann probability distribution. We generate a dynamic model of the evolution of preferences by assuming that
the intensity of interaction involves the product of preference at current time to preference at an earlier time, i.e.
introduce a lag time.
On the Renyi-Erdos (equivalent neighbor) network, the mean of preferences s of each group is proportional to the
exponential of the intensity of interactions (negative energy):
SA(t+ 1) =
∑MA
s=−MA
ses[J1SA(t)+K12SB(t)]∑MA
s=−MA
es[J1SA(t)+K12SB(t)]
(1)
SB(t+ 1) =
∑MB
s=−MB
ses[J2SB(t)+K21SA(t)]∑MB
s=−MB
es[J2SB(t)+K21SA(t)]
(2)
We introduce a lag time as we assume the preference s at time t + 1 interacts with the averages SA and SB at an
earlier time t. The time is measured in units of the delay time. The sums on the right hand sites of Eqs. (1)-(2)
involve the Brillouin function [18]:
B(x, y, J,K,M) = (M +
1
2
)cotanh[(M +
1
2
)(Jx+Ky)]−
1
2
cotanh[
1
2
(Jx+Ky)] (3)
Equations (1)-(2) can be written as:
SA(t+ 1) = B(SA(t), SB(t), J1,K12,MA) (4)
SB(t+ 1) = B(SB(t), SA(t), J2,K21,MB) (5)
An analysis of the linearized equations (4)-(5), valid for small SA and SB, gives the region of the parameter space
where an ordered phase (|SA| > 0, |SB| > 0) can exist beside the disordered phase (SA = SB = 0):
J1 − J1c
K12
J2 − J2c
K21
= 1 (6)
where J1c and J2c are the critical values of the couplings when the two networks are decoupled: if the states of an
individual are −MA,−MA + 1,−MA + 2, ...,MA − 1,MA for A and the similar for B then J1c = 3/MA(MA + 1) ;
J2c = 3/MB(MB + 1). The eigenvalues of the Jacobian ∂[J1(t+ 1), J2(t+ 1)]/∂[J1(t), J2(t)] are:
λ1,2 =
1
2
[
J1
J1c
+
J2
J2c
±
√
(
J1
J1c
−
J2
J2c
)2 + 4
K12
J1c
K21
J2c
] (7)
On the manifold of equation (6) both eigenvalues are equal to 1. The eigenvalues can become complex provided
K12 ∗ K21 < 0. In such cases the average SA and SB exhibit oscillations as function of time. The period of such
oscillations is given by
Period =
2π
arctan(λI/λR)
(8)
where λR and λI are the real and imaginary parts of the eigenvalue. When the eigenvalue absolute value is less than
unity the average S evolves in time to a non-zero value while when the eigenvalue absolute value is less than unity
the average S evolves in time to zero.
4III. MEAN-FIELD RESULTS
To get acquainted with the model that involves four couplings and two numbers of states, we consider next only
MA =MB = 3, and present graphs of the time series of the averages SA and SB.
In Fig. 1 we show decoupled networks with: weak intra-couplings (below the critical value 0.25); one strong
intra-group coupling (above the critical value 0.25) and one weak intra-group; and strong intra-group couplings.
FIG. 1: Decoupled networks K12 = K21 = 0. (a) intra-group couplings weak with J1 = J2 = 0.1, SA and SB converge to zero;
(b) strong and weak intra-coupling with J1 = 0.1 and J2 = 0.3, SA converges to non-zero value and SB to zero; (c) strong
intra-couplings J1 = J2 = 0.3, SA and SB converge to non-zero values.
In the opposite regime, for zero intra-group couplings, we get oscillatory behavior when K12 and K21 have opposite
signs as shown in Fig. 2.
The qualitative pattern of time evolution may also depend on initial conditions. In Fig. 3 we show the time
evolution for K12 = K21 = −0.3, same values as in Fig. 1f but with different initial conditions.
In Fig. 4 we consider the time evolution of preferences SA and SB in the presence of inter-group and intra-group
interactions. First we consider the inter-group couplings of Fig. 2a, −K12 = K21 = 0.2 and include intra-group
interactions. As we increase the strength of J1, J2 the time evolution evolves from decaying oscillations (as in Fig.
2a); it continuously changes to sustained oscillations of increasing period; it discontinuously changes to steady non-zero
values for SA, SB.
In Figure 2c we have shown that the two groups preferences SA, SB evolve to zero in the absence of intra-group
couplings and for weak inter-group couplings K12 = K21. Turning on the inner couplings, for weak values of J1 and
J2 this situation is preserved (Fig. 5). However for sufficiently large intra-group couplings one gets a time evolution
to non-zero SA and SB as shown in Fig. 6. The transition between the two situations is continuous.
In Fig. 2e we have shown that the two groups preferences SA, SB evolve to zero in the absence of intra-group
couplings and for weak inter-group couplings K12 = K21 = −0.20. For small values of J1 and J2 this situation is
preserved. For sufficiently large intra-group couplings J1 = J2 = 0.05 one gets a time evolution to non-zero SA and
SB as shown in Fig. 5. The transition between the two situations is discontinuous.
IV. EXPLORING APPLICATIONS TO REAL CONFLICTS
We illustrate below a series of possible trajectories of the two groups’ willingness to engage in negotiations, when
the individuals’ preferences for resolving the conflict range between -3 and 3. Individuals with s = 3 show extreme
adherence to their group’s values, with a consequent lack of willingness to enter negotiations and make concessions.
5FIG. 2: zero intra-group interactions J1 = J2 = 0, (a) −K12 = K21 = 0.2 damped oscillations; (b) −K12 = K21 = 0.3
oscillations; (c) K12 = K21 = 0.2 decay to zero; (d) K12 = K21 = 0.3 convergence to non-zero value; (e) K12 = K21 = −0.2
decay to zero; (f) K12 = K21 = −0.3 convergence to non-zero value.
s = −3 for individuals lacking ideological adherence (independents), with a consequent openness to be persuaded to
an opponent’s views. Individuals with s in the mid-range are willing to negotiate settlements consistent with their
own values.
In Fig. 1 there is no inter-group communication. This can occur in very protracted political disputes where even
6FIG. 3: with J1 = J2 = 0, K12 = K21 = −0.3 as in Fig. 2f with different initial conditions. Through different patterns systems
evolve to same nonzero values.
FIG. 4: All graphs are for −K12 = K21 = 0.2. For J1 = J2 < 0.15 the time evolution is decaying oscillations as in Fig. 2a. In
Fig. 4a J1 = J2 = 0.15 the state is critical and the amplitude of oscillations does not decay in time. In Fig. 4b J1 = J2 = 0.6
the period of oscillations is long. In Fig. 4c J1 = J2 = 0.7 the SA, SB evolve in time to non-zero steady state values. The
transition from Fig. 4b to Fig. 4c is discontinuous.
discussing matters with individuals from an opposing group is discouraged or considered a sign of wavering values.
This is reminiscent of the 2009 debates surrounding the Affordable Care Act, which have barely abated since passage
of the Act. In Fig. 1, where the two networks are ”decoupled,” individuals within each group act weakly in their
efforts to persuade each other to their own points of view. In time the two groups converge to disorder. This does
not mean that they would necessarily reach an agreement.
In Fig. 2, the two groups are still decoupled. While Group A has the same weak intra-group interactions as before,
individuals in Group B interact with each other more vigorously. As a result, Group A slowly converges to 0 (disorder,
open to negotiations or conflict) as before, but Group B heads toward polarization, becoming more attached to its
own core values and less open to compromises. This asymmetry in the intensity of activism within groups can occur
7FIG. 5: K12 = K21 = 0.2. For J1 = J2 < 0.05, SA and SB go to zero for long times, as shown in Fig. 2c. For J1 = J2 = 0.06,
SA and SB approach a non-zero value for long time.
FIG. 6: K12 = K21 = −0.2. For J1 = J2 < 0.05, SA and SB go to zero for long times, as shown in Fig. 2c. For J1 = J2 = 0.05,
SA and SB approach a non-zero value for long time.
if the contentious policy under consideration is of more importance to one group than the other. In our political
example, gun control policies are more tied to Republican identity than for Democrats for whom it may be a matter
of practical interest. The result (for the time period considered here) is that in the mid-term the groups may converge
to a willingness to negotiate (e.g, negotiate some background check measures), but in the long run the group for whom
opposing any gun control policy is more important (here Group B) will gravitate toward intransigence.
In Figs. 3-6 we explore situations where individuals within each networks interact not only with each other but
also with those from the opposing network. In Fig. 3, the two groups have weak intra-group interactions as in Fig.
1, but inter-group communications produce oscillations of the average group opinions before they converge in time to
a centrist stance for both, as in Fig. 1. Thus the possibility of interacting with opponents gives each individual food
for thought and even moves the stance of each group before eventually causing openness to negotiations. Interactions
between Democrats and Republicans regarding national security issues may exhibit this pattern. The interaction
pattern of Fig. 4a is the result of the fact that each group reacts negatively to the stances of individuals in the other
group K12 ∗ K21 < 0. As a result, instead of converging the stances of the groups are locked in a long-run, lagged
oscillation from belligerence to conciliatory stances. Such dynamics occur sometimes in Democrat-Republican debates
over social issues such as raising the minimum wage.
Figure 7 shows a return to convergence, with one group (with strong intra-group interactions) arriving monotonically
at a willingness to negotiate with the other group (with weak intra-group connections) oscillating between some
turning points before stabilizing, because individuals are swayed more by the other group than by their peers. In our
political example, such asymmetric patterns may emerge around issues that are cross-cutting across party lines, such
as unwillingness on both sides to intervene militarily in international conflicts (”boots on the ground”).
FIG. 7: Coupled networks with J1 = J2 = 0.25, K12 = −0.01, K21 = 4: SA and SB approach zero, oscillate in long run, SA
monotonically, and SB through oscillations between conflict and conciliation.
8The difference between Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 is the heightened effect of Group B on members of Group A. This
asymmetry produces wide, long-term oscillations in both groups’ average stances, which may be due to the lagged
mutual reactions to dialog. As well, Group A has swings of lower amplitude than Group B. The temporary hold
at each extreme value for Group B reflects the lesser influence of Group A on it. This pattern might correspond
to how Democratic and Republican candidates in the upcoming elections react both to pressures from their own
constituencies and to opponents’ proposals for responding to immigration and refugees challenges.
FIG. 8: As in Fig. 7 with more negative K12, namely J1 = J2 = 0.25, K12 = −0.1, K21 = 4: both SA and SB oscillate in the
long run.
Figures 1 to 7 illustrate long-term effects of the multiplex interactions between networked individuals in two groups,
each of whom has a preference for how the inter-group conflict should be addressed, depending on their degrees of
adherence to group values. They show that different assumptions about the intensity of intra- and inter-group
interactions yield qualitatively different long-term patterns. Convergence, polarization or oscillatory patterns may
correspond to real situations in which two conflicting groups are involved.
V. MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS
While the mean field model is exact [14],[15] for the static (equilibrium, infinite time limit) of an infinitely large
system on the equivalent neighbor lattice, we are interested to model finite size systems and to expand the model to
finite range interactions. To this end we next perform Monte Carlo simulations on the dynamic model.
A. Method
We consider two coupled systems, called A and B, having the same number of individuals N . As in the previous
sections, each individual interacts with all other individuals of his or her group and with the average of the other
group. The energy at time t+ 1 of an individual si of Group A and that of an individual sk of Group B are written
as
EAi (t+ 1) = −JAsi(t+ 1)
1
N
∑
j∈A
sj(t)−KAB < SB > (t)si(t+ 1) (9)
EBk (t+ 1) = −JBsk(t+ 1)
1
N
∑
m∈B
sm(t)−KBA < SA > (t)sk(t+ 1) (10)
where JA is the interaction between individual i of group A at time t + 1 with other individuals j belonging to the
same group at time t and KAB denotes the interaction between an individual of Group A at time t + 1 with the
average < SB > (t) of Group B at the previous time t. JB and KBA are defined in the same manner for Group B.
The sums are performed over all individuals belonging to a group as indicated.
We have performed Monte Carlo (MC) simulations using the above equations at various ”social temperatures” T for
N = 1296 individuals for each group. Most of simulations have been done with this group size, but we have checked
the validity of our results for twice and three times larger groups. The results do not vary with sizes of this order of
magnitude. As we know in statistical physics, the finite-size effect manifests at and near the transition temperature
Tc defined in the next subsection. Far from Tc, the finite-size effect is not significant in the collective behavior of
the system. That is the reason why the theory of finite-size effect (see for example Ref. 17) relates various physical
9quantities to the system size only around Tc. This theory helps determine critical properties of a system by using
several sizes in MC simulations. In our simulations, we did not focus on the critical properties, so we did not use
systematically many sizes. The reason why we used N = 1296 spins is that at this size the error (relative uncertainty)
on Tc is ≃ 1/
√
(N) = 3% which is sufficient for our purpose. Note that in opinion surveys, populations of about one
thousand individuals are often used to have results with this error (larger sizes yield smaller errors but this is not
necessary because there are other factors in opinion surveys which alter the results at this error magnitude such as
the rate of opinion change, the non-rigorous population representative composition in the sample etc).
Note that in the mean-field sections presented above, the ”social temperature” has been included in the definitions
of J1, J2, K12 and K21, namely J1 = JA/T , J2 = JB/T , K12 = KAB/T and K21 = KBA/T .
The algorithm, called Metropolis, is the following:
(i) we generate independently two groups each of which has an initial condition at t = 0 for its members;
(ii) we equilibrate each group at a fixed T before turning on the interaction between them;
(iii) At time t + 1, we calculate the energy Eo of an individual si of Group A with Eq. (9) using the average of
Group B at the previous time, namely < SB > (t). We change the state of si at random and calculate its new energy
En. If the new energy En is lower than the old one Eo, the new state is accepted. Otherwise it is accepted only with
a probability proportional to exp[−(En −Eo)/T ]. We go next to another individual of Group A and update its state
until all are considered. We then calculate the average < SA > (t+1) =
∑
i∈A si(t+1)/N of Group A to be used for
the next time. We do this for all members of Group B.
As mentioned earlier, the two groups may have different intrinsic characteristics defined by their own parameters
which are the intra-group interaction JA or JB, the number of individual states qA or qB, and the individual stance
MA or MB. These parameters may differ among the two groups. For simplicity, we will take MA = MB = 3 as in
the mean-field sections. An individual of Group A has qA states ranging from −MA to +MA, and an individual of
Group B has qB states ranging from −MB to +MB. The meaning of these states has been discussed in the mean-field
sections.
B. Thermodynamic properties at equilibrium
To facilitate the understanding of the dynamic behavior of the two groups upon interaction, let us show first the
thermodynamic properties of each group before the interaction. We use the word ”thermodynamic” borrowed from
statistical physics to describe the properties of a system in which we introduce the social temperature (or noise) to
represents a societal perturbation. The term ”equilibrium” indicates the state where there is no time-dependence in
contrast to the dynamics presented below. In the absence of social perturbation, T = 0, each group is in its base state:
its energy, given by the J term of Eqs. (9)-(10), is at a minimum, with all individuals aligned with each other. When
T 6= 0 each individual fluctuates between the qA (or qB) states. We define a measure which expresses the average
strength of Group ℓ (ℓ = A,B) as
Sℓ =
1
N
〈
∑
i∈ℓ
si(t)〉 (11)
where
∑
i∈ℓ si(t)/N is the spatial average at time t and 〈...〉 denotes the long-term average. Then |Sℓ| =Mℓ is at the
base state but decerases as the individuals fluctuates. There exists a so-called ”critical temperature” Tc above which
Sℓ = 0 due to fluctuations of individuals between −Mℓ and Mℓ. As will be seen below, Tc plays an important role in
understanding the dynamic behavior of two groups A and B when their interaction is turned on.
Note that while studying the group dynamics, the time average will not be computed. The time dependence of SA
and SB are computed with the mean-field approach in Eqs. (1)-(2). For MC simulations they are computed with the
algorithm described in the previous subsection.
C. Case of similar groups with opposite attitudes: dynamic properties
We show the simplest example in Fig. 9 where JA = JB, MA = MB = 3, qA = qB = 7 with the initial condition
SA = −SB = 3, namely Group A does not want to negotiate while Group B wants to negotiate. Without interaction,
the two groups are stable up to T 0c ≃ 102 as shown in Fig. 9a. When the two groups interact with each other, the
critical temperature is reduced to Tc ≃ 53. The temperature zone between Tc and T
0
c seen belowis interesting: it is in
this zone that each group, though disordered upon interaction, has the ”memory” of its initial ”ordered” state when
there was no interaction with the other. Indeed, it is in this zone that the stances of two groups oscillate periodically
10
in time as seen in Fig. 10b. Below this zone, each group keeps its own stance (Fig. 10a) and beyond this zone the
stances of two groups fluctuate in a ”chaotic” manner with small oscilations around zero, as seen in Fig. 10c.
FIG. 9: (a) Before interaction JA = JB = 0.02, qA = qB = 7, initial conditions SA = −SB = 3, both groups become
”disordered” at T 0c ≃ 102 (arbitrary unit), (b) With inter-group interaction −KAB = KBA = 0.005, both groups become
”disordered” at Tc = 53.
FIG. 10: Dynamics of two groups upon interaction −KAB = KBA = 0.005 with JA = JB = 0.02, qA = qB = 7, initial
conditions SA = −SB = 3: (a) at ”social temperature” T = 48 below Tc = 53 where both groups are ”ordered”, (b) at ”social
temperature” T = 74 between Tc and T
0
c (values given in the caption of Fig. 9), (c) at T = 125 above T
0
c in the initial
disordered phase of both groups. See text for comments.
D. Case of two groups with different strengths: dynamic properties
Let us show now a second example where the numbers of states in the two groups are different: we take qA = 7 and
qB = 3. As it is known in statistical physics, the larger the number of states the lower the critical temperature. We
see this in Fig. 11a when the two groups do not interact: Group A has T 0c (A) ≃ 102 and Group B has T
0
c (B) ≃ 151.
When the groups interact with each other, they become disordered at the same critical ”social temperature” Tc ≃ 92
which is much lower than their initial non-interaction critical temperatures.
As in the previous case, the two groups with different initial critical temperatures T 0c (A) and T
0
c (B) show stability
of their stances below Tc but an oscillation of the stances between T
0
c (A) and T
0
c (B) as seen in Fig. 12a and Fig. 12b.
At temperatures beyond T 0c (B) the stances strongly fluctuate around their zero value (see Fig. 12c).
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FIG. 11: (a) Before interaction JA = JB = 0.02, qA = 7, qB = 3, initial conditions SA = −SB = 3, Group A becomes
”disordered” at T 0c (A) ≃ 102 (arbitrary unit) while Group B has T
0
c (B) ≃ 151, (b) With interaction −KAB = KBA = 0.005,
both groups become ”disordered” at Tc ≃ 92.
FIG. 12: Dynamics of two groups upon interaction −KAB = KBA = 0.005 with JA = JB = 0.02, qA = 7, qB = 3, initial
conditions SA = −SB = 3: (a) At ”social temperature” T = 81 below Tc = 92 where both groups are ”ordered”, (b)-(c) at
”social temperatures” T = 115 and 132 between T 0c (A) = 102 and T
0
c (B) = 151 (cf. Fig. 11), (d) at T = 166 above T
0
c (A) and
T 0c (B). See text for comments.
E. Case of two groups with inter-group conflict interaction
In the examples above, we considered cases where −KAB = KBA > 0. If we look at the second term in Eqs.
(9)-(10) we see that for the signs of these inter-group interactions the energy of each individual is lowered by the
interaction, taking into account the initial conditions. As a consequence, although the interaction softens their stance,
each group keeps its stance, namely its sign, up to the critical social temperature (see Figs. 9b, 11b). shows We show
now another case where the interaction of one group with the other group destabilizes its stance, causing a change in
its attitude with respect to negotiation. For this purpose, we take the same sign of KAB and KBA, KAB = KBA > 0.
Choosing the initial condition as before, namely SA = −SB = 3, we see from Eqs. (9)-(10) that the second term
of Group A is positive. This increases the energy of individuals in A. As a consequence, we expect that Group
A is destabilized and changes its stance (its sign) at some temperature. Group B with negative interaction energy
”succeeds” in persuading Group A to negotiate. Let us show the case where JA = JB = 0.02, qA = 7, qB = 3 and
initial conditions SA = −SB = 3. The non-interacting groups have been shown in Fig. 11a. The groups in interaction
with KAB = KBA = 0.005 are shown in Fig. 13a: Group A changes its mind at TR ≃ 51 from positive to negative.
Both become disordered at Tc ≃ 169. Note that this value is larger than the value of non-interacting B which is
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T 0c (B) ≃ 151 (see Fig. 11a): this means that interaction with the opposite group in this case yields a stability benefit.
FIG. 13: Before interaction, Groups A and B with JA = JB = 0.02, qA = 7, qB = 3 and initial conditions SA = −SB = 3, are
shown in Fig. 11a. Curve (a) shows SA and SB vs T with interaction KAB = KBA = 0.005. Group A changes sign (attitude)
at TR ≃ 51. Curves (b) show time dependence of SA and SB at T = 64, above TR but below Tc = 169.
F. Asymmetric interaction amplitudes
Figures 14 and 15 show the case where KAB and KBA have different magnitudes in addition to their different signs.
In Fig. 14a, we show a case where KAB = −0.05, KBA = 0.005. The two groups do not change their attitude upon
interaction but the critical temperature is reduced from 102 to 51. Both groups have strong periodic oscillations in
time in the temperature range between their new critical temperature Tc = 51 and their ”old” critical temperature
T 0c (A,B) = 102 before interacting, as seen in Fig. 14b at T = 81. This dynamic behavior has been observed above in
Fig. 10b and Fig. 12b in the respective temperature regions between their Tc and T
0
c (A,B). Note that the oscillations
are still present above T 0c (A,B) but they lose progressively their periodic character both in amplitude and periodicity
as seen in Fig. 14c at T = 115 and Fig. 14d at T = 166.
- 3
- 2
- 1
0
1
2
3
0 20 40 60 80 100
S
A
 
,
 
S
B
T
(a)
- 3
- 2
- 1
0
1
2
3
0 20 40 60 80 100
S
A
 
,
 
S
B
t
(b)
- 2
- 1. 5
- 1
- 0. 5
0
0. 5
1
1. 5
2
0 20 40 60 80 100
S
A
 
,
 
S
B
t
(c)
- 1
- 0. 5
0
0. 5
1
1. 5
0 20 40 60 80 100
S
A
 
,
 
S
B
t
(d)
FIG. 14: Before interaction, Groups A and B with JA = JB = 0.02, qA = 7, qB = 7 and initial conditions SA = −SB = 3,
are shown in Fig. 9a with T 0c (A,B) = 102. The present figure shows the effect of the asymmetric interactions KAB = −0.05,
KBA = 0.005: (a) SA and SB vs T . One has Tc = 51. (b)-(c) time dependence of SA and SB at T = 81 and T = 115,
respectively. (d) time dependence of SA and SB at T = 166 above T
0
c (A,B). See text for comments.
We reverse now the strength of K, namely KAB = −0.005, KBA = 0.05. In Fig. 15a and Fig. 15b, Group B
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changes its attitude from the initial state -3 to positive value upon interaction. The critical temperature remains as
that in the previous case, namely Tc = 51. As before, between Tc and T
0
c (A,B) we expect perfect periodic oscillations
of SA and SB. This is indeed observed in Fig. 15c at T = 81. Above T
0
c (A,B) we lose the regularity of the oscillations
progressively as seen in Fig. 15d at T = 115, as in previous cases examined so far.
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FIG. 15: The same parameters as those of Fig. 14 except for interactions KAB = −0.005, KBA = 0.05: (a) SA and SB vs T ,
the critical temperature is Tc ≃ 51. (b) time dependence of SA and SB at T = 47 below Tc. (c)-(d) time dependence of SA
and SB at T = 81 and T = 115, respectively. See text for comments.
G. Effect of intra-group interactions
In the cases shown above We have assumed the same value for JA and JB. For completeness, we examine next
the effect of JA and JB. If JA and JB are both equal to zero, then the group have no order at any T . When the
interaction is turned on, they remain disordered as seen in Fig. 16a. As seen in all cases above, in the disordered
phase, SA and SB fluctuate strongly with time and progressively losing the periodic character with increasing T as
seen in Fig. 16.
We show in Fig. 17 the strong K limit: with KAB = KBA the groups oscillate with T between ±3 (Fig. 17a). At
a given T , SA and SB oscillate periodically with time (Fig. 17b) as in the case of weak K shown in Fig. 16b. Note
however that these oscillations persist for all T unlike the case of weak K. With −KAB = KBA (opposite signs), the
two groups behave in the same manner with time (Fig. 17c, Fig. 17d) but SA and SB remain zero for all temperatures
(not shown).
Figure 18 shows the case where JA 6= JB. Without interaction K, the asymmetric interactions give rise to T
0
c (A) 6=
T 0c (B) as seen in Fig. 18. As expected, when the interaction is taken into account, both groups have a critical
in-between temperature . Dynamics of SA and SB are shown in Fig. 19 in the case −KAB = KBA = 0.005 where
there is a change of sign of SB. It is interesting to note that there are very slow but aperiodic oscillations at T = 81
below T 0c (A) = 102 (Fig. 19b).
If we reverse the signs of K, namely KAB = −KBA = 0.005, we do not obtain the change of sign of B as seen in
Figs. 18 and 19: this is shown in Fig. 20 where we also observe slow and non periodic oscillations with time.
VI. SUMMARY, COMPARISON OF MONTE CARLO AND MEAN-FIELD RESULTS, DISCUSSION
We have seen in MC simulations that qualitatively different dynamic behaviors of SA and SB occur in time for
different regions of the parameter space. We summarize these findings and compare them to the mean-field results:
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FIG. 16: Before interaction, Groups A and B with JA = JB = 0, qA = 7, qB = 7 and initial conditions SA = −SB = 3, have
no order at any T . (a) SA and SB vs T with interaction KAB = −0.005, KBA = 0.05, there is no order at any T . (b)-(c)-(d)
SA and SB vs time t at T = 41, 58 and 83, respectively. See text for comments.
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FIG. 17: Before interaction, Groups A and B with JA = JB = 0, qA = 7, qB = 7 and initial conditions SA = −SB = 3, have no
order. (a) SA and SB vs T with strong interaction KAB = KBA = 0.3. There is no order at any T but chaotic oscillations are
seen between the two limits ±3 due to strong K. (b) SA and SB at T = 41 for KAB = KBA = 0.3. This oscillation behavior
is observed for all T unlike the weak K. (c)-(d) SA and SB vs T with strong interaction −KAB = KBA = ±0.2 at T = 41 and
T = 166. See text for comments.
• When two groups interact with each other, whatever their respective critical temperatures T 0c (A) and T
0
c (B)
before the interaction, they have the same critical temperature Tc upon interaction. If T
0
c (A) = T
0
c (B) (similar
systems with JA = JB, qA = qB and MA =MB), Tc lies below T
0
c (A,B) (Fig. 9b, Fig. 14a). If T
0
c (A) 6= T
0
c (B),
Tc is lower than both (Fig. 11b). The transition at Tc is of first order (see discontinuities in Fig. 9b, Fig. 11b,
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FIG. 18: Groups A and B with JA = 0.02, JB = 0.01, qA = 7, qB = 7, and initial conditions SA = −SB = 3. (a) Without
interaction: SA and SB vs T , one has T
0
c (A) = 102, T
0
c (B) = 51. (b) With interaction −KAB = KBA = 0.005: SA and SB vs
T , one has Tc ≃ 70. Group B changes its attitude. See text for comments.
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FIG. 19: Dynamics of the case shown in Fig. 18: (a)-(b)-(c)-(d) show SA and SB vs time t at T = 47 (below Tc = 70), 81, 115
and 166, respectively. See text for comments.
Fig. 14a).
• Periodic oscillations occur inside a temperature zone between the Tc and the smaller of T
0
c (A) and T
0
c (B) (Fig.
10b, Fig. 12b, Fig. 14b). For higher temperatures, SA and SB lose progressively the periodic character of their
oscillations (Fig. 12c, Fig. 14c, Fig. 15d). For T higher than the larger of T 0c (A) and T
0
c (B), SA and SB exhibit
small ”chaotic” fluctuations around 0 (Fig. 10c, Fig. 12d, Fig. 14d).
• When JA > JB or vice-versa, depending on the signs of KAB and KBA, SA and SB keep or change their
attitude at T < Tc. For higher temperatures, oscillations of attitude are very slow but they become chaotic with
increasing T (Fig. 19, Fig. 20).
• In the absence of intra-group interactions, namely JA = JB = 0, there is no order in either group. The
dynamics of SA and SB depend on the signs and the amplitudes of KAB and KBA: if KAB and KBA are small,
oscillations of SA and SB are regular but they do not have constant amplitudes (Fig. 16). If KAB and KBA are
large (≃ 0.2− 0.3 for example) oscillations are slow at low T and chaotic at high T .
To compare the results from MC simulations to the results obtained by mean-field theory we recall that the equations
of Section II include the temperature T in the definition of the interactions. Hence the mean-field parameters are
related to the MC parameters by J1 = JA/T , J2 = JB/T , K12 = KAB/T and K21 = KBA/T . Increasing J1 for
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FIG. 20: Dynamics for the case KAB = −KBA = 0.005 with JA = 0.02, JB = 0.01, qA = 7, qB = 7, and initial conditions
SA = −SB = 3 (as in Fig. 18): in this case B does not change its sign and one has Tc ≃ 70 (not shown): (a)-(b)-(c)-(d) show
SA and SB vs time t at T = 47 (below Tc), 81, 115 and 166, respectively. See text for comments.
example means decreasing T or increasing JA in MC simulation and vice-versa. The critical value J1c means JA/Tc
in MC parameters.
Mean-field results shown in Fig. 1-Fig. 8 have the same main characteristics as those of MC simulations: oscillations
of SA and SB within some ranges of the parameters and convergence toward different values within other ranges.
We have interpreted those phenomena in terms of conflicts and willingness to negotiate. The mean-field model is an
approximation valid in the limit of an infinitely large number of individuals. It captures the main features found in
MC simulations on finite systems. For the particular model used in this paper where each individual interacts with
all others, the equilibrium (with no time dependence) state is exactly characterized by the mean-field theory[19],[15].
The oscillatory regime is also correctly captured in the mean field theory model. The chaotic time variations of SA
and SB observed in some MC simulations do not appear in the mean field model which does not exhibit deterministic
chaos and ignores thermal fluctuations. We note that the phenomenon which occurs in each case shown in this paper
depends on the relative ratios and signs between values of parameters, but not on their absolute values. Therefore,
the choice of J1 and J2 of the order of 0.02 in MC simulations is to keep K parameters in the same order of magnitude
and T in the range around 100.
The dynamics of each group depend on the sign of the total action on each individual: J action from his or her
partners in the same group and K action from the other group, both at a previous time. The total action HA on an
individual of group A can be written using the energy given by Eq. (9):
EAi (t+ 1) = −HAsi(t+ 1) (12)
where HA = [JA
1
N
∑
j∈A
sj(t) +KAB < SB > (t)] (13)
si(t+ 1) is such as to render E
A
i (t + 1) negative. To clarify the dynamic rule, let us imagine the following scenario.
If HA > 0 then si(t + 1) should be > 0; it means that if si(t) is < 0 at time t, individual i should change his/her
preference sign at time t + 1. This dynamic applies to other individuals of Group A so that at the end all change
their attitude. We can imagine other scenarios. The rule is that si(t+ 1) should follow the sign of HA(t) which is, as
seen from Eq. (13), a function of JA, KAB and the signs of sj(t) of A and of < SB > (t). The reader can verify the
dynamic rule for each case presented above. Of course, if HA and si(t + 1) have the same sign, then the individual
keeps his or her stance although he or she can modify ”a little bit” his or her attitude by choosing other ”preference
states” of the same sign.
Note that the above scenario describes the attitude dynamics at low T . However, in a society governed by a ”high”
temperature, there are always individuals who break the ”negative-energy rule” mentioned above. As a consequence,
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the stance of each group is weakened as T increases, until it breaks down at Tc, as shown in the previous sections.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have studied the dynamic behavior of two groups of individuals in conflict. Each group is defined
by two parameters which express the intra-group strength of interaction among members and its attitude toward
negotiations. The interaction with the other group is parameterized by a constant which expresses an attraction or a
repulsion to the other group average attitude. In addition, the model includes a social temperature T which acts on
each group and quantifies the social noise. For a given set of parameters, the results show that the dynamic behavior
depends on T as summarized and discussed in section VI. One of the most striking features is the periodic oscillation
of the attitudes towards negotiation or conflict for certain ranges of parameter values.
Clearly not all characteristics of a real two-group conflict can be captured in a model. We view this model to
be a tool for anticipation rather than prediction. While prediction has to be right within a usefully narrow range,
anticipation helps map the field of possibilities for strategizing purposes. The values/ranges chosen for the various
model parameters are illustrative and can be changed for exploratory purposes or if data show that it is warranted.
As a final remark, we believe that models in statistical physics [18] are suitable for describing social phenomena
thanks to the fact that the spatial average will retain only common macroscopic aspects of an ensemble. Personal
atypical characters will be erased in the averaging. This is the reason why rules for particles may be applied to
the study of human and animal behaviors. Opinion surveys for example classify in the same category people with
similar backgrounds in education or psychologic or political profiles. These shared backgrounds limit the number of
macroscopic categories: it is unlikely that two millions of people have two millions of distinct preferences. The same
is observed in physics: particles in the same system have each a different eigenstate, but observables or macroscopic
properties retain only their common characters after the averaging process.
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